In 1978, the novelist John Gardner published a rather slender treati called On Moral Fiction in which he claimed that true art must be mor that little art being produced then was moral and, therefore, that mos of his contemporaries were either bad artists or not artists at all.' It is difficult to recall a book about literature and/or ethics-at least one written by a novelist or poet rather than, say, by William Bennett-tha has been received with so much hostility, especially among other writers and artists. Was the hostile response deserved, or is ther beneath the polemics and diatribes, anything worth listening to Gardner's call for renewed attention to the ethical obligations an effects .of fiction or of literature more generally?
The reactions to Gardner's book largely divided along ideologic lines. Some conservatives and neo-conservatives appreciated his bas argument that art must be moral and that most contemporary literatu and criticism were misguided, even if they found the book otherw flawed (see, e.g., Epstein) . Most critics and theorists on the left and mo of the writers whose work he discussed in the book rejected his arg ments with disdain. A special 1980 issue of Fiction International include 28 mostly brief, mostly negative, and occasionally scathing respons to Gardner's book by such writers as John Barth, Raymond Federman, Gilbert Sorrentino, John Updike2 (although a few less well-know writers and critics did praise some aspects of the book). In Barth's own 1980 essay, "The Literature of Replenishment," Barth calls On Mor Fiction a "tract . . . an exercise in literary kneecapping that lump modernists and postmodernists together without distinction and co signs us all to Hell with the indiscriminate fervor characteristic of late converts to the right" (66-67). Many reviewers and most of his pee responded as a group of parents would if their children's teacher h written a book called The Joys of Pedophilia. Robert Towers' review the New York Review of Books was titled "Good Grief!"Although Tower does suggest we shouldn't dismiss On Moral Fiction altogether, he criticizes "the puritanical strain underlying Gardner's exhortations and notes that Gardner "flings about the words 'moral' and 'immor shamelessly, evoking salvation and hell-fire" (31). Roger Sale's revie 40 in the New York Times Book Review was called "Banging on the Table."3 What provoked such strong reactions?
Gardner's book is certainly in the same polemical tradition Tolstoy' s What Is Art?, written in 1897 after Tolstoy's religious conversion. Tolstoy, who Gardner discusses, argued that true art must un all men in "sonship to God and. .. the brotherhood of man" (150, m emphases)--either through affirming these true Christian ideals o through sharing simple, honest human feelings. But Tolstoy was wi ing to take the consequences of his own theory--consigning his ow books War and Peace and Anna Karenina to the category of bad art, whil raising china dolls (and two lesser, didactic stories of his own) to th pedestal of good art. Gardner's book, on the other hand, was perceiv by many as self-serving, a forum in which to criticize his peers an defend his own work (or at least what he wanted his work to be). Ronald Sukenick called On Moral Fiction "a sort of advertisement for himself [Gardner] " and thought the best response to the book was to ignore it ("A Writers' Forum," 21). But many "classic" works of literary criticism by practicing writers, such as Wordsworth's Preface to Lyrical Ballads or Eliot's "Tradition and the Individual Talent," can also be seen as primarily explanations, justifications, and/or defenses of the writers' own work.
The hostile tone of many responses to Gardner's book can be explained in at least three ways: 1) his contemporaries took great offense at being called immoral or amoral and thus bad writers; 2) many artists, writers, critics, and theorists, find discussions of morality and art quite uncomfortable; or 3) the book is weak, flawed, or stupid.4 While there may be some legitimacy to the third of these explanations, I would like to focus more on the first two, since I find Gardner's book flawed but provocative and parts of his argument worth serious attention.
Recent debates about NEA and NEH funding, about public school curricula, about violence and, even worse, talk shows on television demonstrate clearly the dangers of judging art solely by rigid and narrowly defined notions of "the moral." But can one acknowledge the risks of evaluating literary and artistic works solely by their supposed moral effects without assuming that discussions of ethics and literature have no place in discourse, even postmodern discourse, today?
Gardner is right that most critics and theorists, from Plato through the Romantics, have assumed that literature has-or should havemoral effects, even if they've disagreed about what those effects may be. In The Republic, Plato argued that poetry was morally corrupting, since it was thrice removed from the truth and fostered emotion rather 42 Marilyn Edelstein than reason. Horace assumed literature could and should teach as well as delight. In An Apology for Poetry, Sir Philip Sidney defended poetry against the charges that had been leveled against it by Plato and b Sidney's contemporary Stephen Gosson. Sidney argued that poetry w the best of all the arts and sciences for moving readers to virtuous actio by sweetly revealing the path to it through blending philosophica precepts with vivid examples. Yet Sidney acknowledged that not a poets successfully moved and taught their readers.
The idea that art should both instruct and delight persisted in mo literary and aesthetic theory through at least the end of the eighteenth century. Gardner argues' that the current critical belief in separating th aesthetic from the moral is traceable to New Criticism, although briefly mentions Kant in this regard. I think Kant was a pivotal figure in this development. In The Critique of Judgment, Kant argues that the judgment of beauty must be separated from the judgment of the go (and of the useful).5 Still, post-Kant, in the early nineteenth centur Romantic poet-critics like Shelley and Wordsworth would argue tha poetry could have subtle moral effects through awakening imagination and empathy. But the moral and the aesthetic were severed almost completely with the rise of aestheticism in the later nineteenth century.6 The foregrounding of the aesthetic or linguistic rather than the ethical dimensions of literature continued in Modernism and in the various twentieth-century formalisms (although contra Gardner, I would argue that New Critics still found "human themes" even in supposed autonomous verbal icons). Structuralism certainly continued this em phasis on form, structure, and language; some believe poststructur ism led to even further evacuation of moral dimensions from litera theory and criticism.7 Criticism in the twentieth century has been mu more interpretive and analytical than evaluative (except in the case book reviews); when value has been an issue, it has been so more oft in terms of aesthetics (and sometimes politics) than ethics. And it evaluative criticism linking the aesthetic and the ethical which Gardner hopes to resuscitate (144-45).
Published at the height of postmodernism in literature, the arts, and theory, On Moral Fiction could easily be seen as a reactionary text by a writer longing for return to an at least interrupted if not outmod tradition. Gardner is, indeed, proud to claim he is taking "the trad tional view" that "true art is moral: it seeks to improve life, not debase it" (5). For Gardner, a literary work that is not "serious and beneficial"
is not bad art-it is not art at all (6). He sees much of the work of h contemporaries, who he claims are often "nihilists, cynics, an merdistes," as tending toward destruction (6), whereas true art must be "life-giving" (15). And certainly many of his contemporaries had rad cally different ideas from Gardner's about the relation between eth and aesthetics. Most postmodernists in the 1970's would have echo Jerry Bumpus in saying "I don't want to improve people with my writing" ("A Writers' Forum," 129) and followed Vladimir Nabokov asserting that their books were not didactic and contained no mor messages.8
Gardner criticizes not only contemporary writers, primarily of fiction, but also the critics who support them, who chatter about "hermaneutics [sic]" rather than the human (129) or debate the definition of postmodernism while the world goes to hell in a handbasket (7). Some recent movements in the arts (like conceptual art) and most contemporary literary theories "evade or suppress moral issues."
Postmodernists, he asserts, "accidentally raise the issue of art's morality and take the wrong side" (55). But now John Gardner comes along, wielding Thor's hammer (the overarching metaphor of the book) to save the day, welcoming the moral back into the fold of critical and theoretical discourse. Since he believes that "Truth, Goodness, and Beauty are the fundamental concerns of art and therefore ought to be the fundamental concerns of criticism" (144), it is only fitting that they are his own preoccupations.9
Although for Gardner true art is and must be moral, he does not believe it should be overtly didactic-and this is a major point of disagreement with Tolstoy. Gardner asserts that artists who set out with a "predetermined message" are doomed to failure (85). For him, "the morality of art is ... far less a matter of doctrine than of process" (91). This view seems similar to Shelley's in "A Defence of Poetry" that poetry with an explicit moral aim is unlikely to have the moral effect that can be achieved through its enlarging of the imagination and thus of the capacity for empathy (328). Art, for Gardner, must discover what it has to say rather than say what it has already discovered (14). For Gardner, propaganda masquerading as literature is just as morally reprehensible as is work that fails to engage seriously any moral issues.
True art, for him, explores moral questions but doesn't preach explicit moral messages.
Gardner argues that art can be moral in several ways: by holding up models of virtue and of decent behavior, by celebrating life's potential with a vision rooted in love (which, for him, Toni Morrison and John Irving do), by clarifying life, by humanizing its readers, by designing "visions worth trying to make fact" (100). Moral art must affirm life and reveal a path to a better possible future.
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Unlike these great writers of especially the postmodernists, ing to Gardner. He argues that Gass "will die quickly, of pure Pynchon and John Barth "will die of intellectual blight, academic n rowness, or fakery" (94).
Gardner does suggest that in Chimera, Barth at least "comes through as a loving, optimistic man" even though the book is flawed by i "underestimation of women" and its author's "egoism." Gardner that "an odd thing about Barth is that he always seems to know wh wrong with his fiction but never fixes it" (95). A piece like Bart "Life-Story" illustrates this problem, Gardner says, as it self-reflexive comments on both the need for and the futility of trying to avoid endl self-reflexiveness (95-96). Yet, one could argue that this double ges of both bemoaning and illustrating the inability to transcend one's ow discourse, is just what the story is about-about the power and limit fiction, language, and understanding. And an awareness of such po and limits seems integral to ethics, insofar as ethics concerns subject's relation to the other.
Gardner does allow that a few of his contemporaries are, indee moral writers. John Fowles is one of the few well-known recent write of whom Gardner approves. Even though Fowles' work is often s conscious, Fowles has convictions and so does his work, Gardner fe Gardner also praises John Cheever, although not as fervently as he doe Fowles, for caring about his characters and his readers, and for hav an affirmative vision. Yet Updike, who explicitly addresses moral religious concerns, is less successful, Gardner says, since he writ stories and novels that are "too much like sermons" and not enou like art, which, he says, must have "an essential and radical openn to persuasion" (99).
Some writers have enormous talent but do not direct it toward the right ends, Gardner believes. William Gass, for instance, has the ability to create vivid characters, to "engage both the reader's emotion and intellect," but his work, in trying to "prove a theory" of language, winds up emptying everything out of his work but language (68). Gass and other postmodernists, who, Gardner claims, are concerned with language over all else or use literary language that is opaque, show a lack of concern for readers, as well as for morality. Such writers are "mor in love, on principle, with the sound of words ... than with creating fictional worlds" (71). Gass, while "the best of [this] lot," is, nonetheless "stubbornly unreadable" (70).
A more readable-perhaps even too readable-postmodernist fiction writer is Kurt Vonnegut, who, Gardner claims, has "moral energy" but is too world-weary and uncommitted to maintain it. Gardner criti cizes Kurt Vonnegut for not caring "enough about his characters to us (who seems to be a minimal refrain may not reflect cynici tique of these. Vonnegut has w after it had been burned in a North Dakota school furnace, that his works "beg that people be kinder and more responsible than they often are" (Palm Sunday, 6). Readers may argue about whether this goal is sincere or successfully achieved, but Gardner does not even consider the possibility that "so it goes" is used ironically or to achieve a moral effect.
Gardner contrasts these immoral or amoral contemporary writers with the great canonical writers of the past-Homer, Sophocles, Virgil, Dante, Shakespeare, Melville--whose works persist because they are grounded in a moral vision. Such works, he says, "exert their civilizing influence century after century" (105). But Gardner believes that in our own century, because of the unhealthy influence of Nietzsche, Freud, Sartre, Wittgenstein, literary theory and criticism (from New Criticism through structuralism and poststructuralism), we have little art or literature that can celebrate life or lead us toward virtue. In part, this is because we live in an age of disbelief; for Gardner, it is difficult to take a properly moral view of art if one does not believe in God or at least in some non-theological foundation for moral values. Gardner is probably right that "most [many?] contemporary writers are hesitant to speak of Truth and Beauty, not to mention God-hesitant to speak of the goodness of man, or the future of the world" (38). Many of us living in the postmodern age are less confident about the existence or meaning of these things than Gardner is, but that does not mean they have ceased to be concerns.10 For Gardner, the current climate of moral relativism and skepticism makes bad art inevitable, plentiful, and nearly victorious in its etern struggle with good art (6). Gardner does not advocate outlawing or banning bad art, "since morality by compulsion is a fool's moralit (105-06). Instead he wants critics and artists to expose and reveal th badness of bad art and to discuss the need and criteria for good, mo art-as he is doing in this book. Gardner is issuing a call for writers rethink the goals of their work and for critics to consider not on aesthetic, linguistic, or political aspects of literary works but also, a most importantly, their ethical dimension.
One can invoke the good, the true, the beautiful even in a largely secular world, Gardner argues. Art, he believes, should convey the good, the true, and the beautiful, even though these are not "things tha exist in the way llamas do, but values which exist when embodied, an furthermore, recognized as embodied" (133).
One of the more valuable parts of Gardner's argument is his claim that these values are neither absolute nor relative. Instead, they a what he calls "relative absolute values," a phrase which seems oxymoronic but is not. This notion is one that I found intriguing when first read the book a decade ago and still find useful today.
Gardner's notion of "relative absolutes" is, I would argue, not so unlike the concept used by a far trendier (and smarter) theorist, Judith
Butler: "contingent foundations." For Butler, traditional (non-conti gent) foundations (such as theological or philosophical grounds for moral value claims) "function as the unquestioned and the unquestio able within any theory." Yet, even from her deconstructive perspective, "the point is not to do away with foundations, or even to champion position that goes under the name of anti-foundationalism," but rath to "expose the foundational premise as a contingent and contestab presumption" (7). Elsewhere, I have used the term "good enoug foundations (borrowing D. W. Winnicott's term for mothers) to suggest that there may be foundational claims, especially for ethics, that ar always subject to scrutiny and even revision, but can still serve as grounds for action. Such a "good enough" foundation for ethical pra tice might include a "belief in love or justice as goods even if their statu as goods cannot be philosophically demonstrated beyond a shadow a doubt" (Edelstein, 14) . For Gardner, the relativity of "relative abs lutes" is in relation to all of human history--someday, other absolut could prevail. But many of us see such relativity (or the contingency of foundations) as a function of space as well as time-reflecting th positions, the cultures, and the identities in which we dwell.
Gardner doesn't despair tha possible in the world we no writers-John Fowles, Grace do seem to search for truth-and Toni Morrison, for whom love is central." But, Gardner argues, if, under the influence of postmodernism, most writers continue to foreground language, texture, structure, while backgrounding plot and especially character, and if critics continue to praise these writers, then literature will fail to achieve its potential as a moral force.
Even though Gardner seems to hold a basically mimetic view of literature, for him, as for Aristotle and Sidney, literature need not show how things are but "how things ought to be" (Gardner, 16) . It should ask moral questions, even if moral answers aren't always available. Gardner believes that the "present scarcity of first-rate art does not follow from a sickness of society but the other way around-unless, possibly, the two chase each other's tails." The mutually influential relationship between the arts and society is certainly more complex than Gardner's metaphor suggests. For Gardner, though, artists seem to have a sacred duty to heal society-and it is his duty to remind other artists of this obligation.
Gardner is "convinced that, once the alarm has been sounded, good art easily beats out bad" (126), and his book is supposed to be this wake-up call. And, indeed, since On Moral Fiction appeared, there has been renewed attention to ethics in/and literature and critical theory. In the last ten years, we have seen the publication of books such as Yet, his book is substantially different from these later ones in that his seeks to prescribe how creative writers themselves should write; even when these more recent books are being prescriptive rather than descriptive, their primary audience is readers and critics, who are accustomed to arguing about how one should read. Perhaps because of both its tone and its timing, On Moral Fiction has not played a significant role in recent theoretical discussions of literature and ethics, even though it has some valuable ideas to contribute to such discussions. Perhaps Gardner's book was widely decried and has since been largely ignored not only because of his harsh judgments of his peers and his era, but because of his limited vision of what moral fiction is.
There are more ways for a novel or story to be moral, to have mor effects, than Gardner considers. Jonathan Baumbach, in his critique Gardner, suggests that "the job of moral fiction ... is to make larg demands on the reader, to create experiences that trouble his mos cherished preconceptions, that allow him no easy gratifications, tha extend his intelligence and enlarge his capacity to feel" ("A Writer Forum," 6). Many contemporary works (e.g., Lolita, Beloved) raise eth cal questions even if they don't provide definitive answers, and encouraging readers to ponder ethical issues can itself have an ethical effec Postmodern fiction can, even through its language and form, also ha ethical effects. Self-reflexive fiction can encourage readers to thi deeply about reality, subjectivity, and alterity; even deeply texture work like Nabokov's or Gass's can defamiliarize language and perce tion and thus make us more fully aware of ourselves and of the wor Works that deal with gender or race need not be "propaganda," Gardner thinks they are, but can-through plot, character, style---en gage, as Gardner thinks all moral fiction should, "universal" concer (love, kinship, death). But many recent writers also manage to retai and celebrate particularity, historical specificity, and thus avoid t effacement of difference, the mistaken identification of the particular (e.g., maleness, whiteness) with the universal. Through exploring bot difference and commonality, many contemporary writers can provi a new vision of ethics based on respect for the other (and the otherness of the other). Many contemporary writers may share Shelley's view how literature can be moral-by developing the imagination and th the capacity for empathy and love. I think of recent novels like Barbara Kingsolver's The Bean Trees and see that life-affirming, aestheticall successful (and also politically engaged) fiction is possible and that there is an appreciative audience for it-even if some of us also val Barth or Barthelme. Gardner's philosophical analyses of goodness, truth, beauty, and morality may be imperfect. Gardner may rely on pre-postmodern assumptions-universality, essentialism, and foundationalism-rather than trying to engage seriously and then refute postmodern critiques of these. But we don't need to throw Gardner's baby (concern with ethics) out with the bathwater (the polemics, diatribes, and flawed judgments in On Moral Fiction). 2. Frederick Exley's judgment there was the most damning and the most succinct: "John Gardner is full of shit" ("A Writers' Forum," 10).
3. For an overview of critical reactions to On Moral Fiction, see , who describes them as "a chorus of denunciation" filled with "contumely from the parties judged, anger and near hysteria on the part of their apologists" (17, 15) . See also MacCurdy, who provides both an analysis of critical reaction and a history of Gardner's work on the subject of moral fiction. MacCurdy suggests that On Moral Fiction "colored everything Gardner published afterwards, as well as the critics' responses to it"; reviewers often criticized his later work "either for being too didactic ..., or for not following his critical theory" (136, 139). 4. Clausen notes that "discussions of literature and ethics make most contem rary critics squirm in their chairs. The largely dismissive response that greeted J Gardner's On Moral Fiction when it came out in 1978 was a notable example of unease" (1).
5. Gardner briefly responds to Kant's argument for the disinterestedness judgments of beauty by claiming that "art ... is not independent of all interest beyond all interest" (162).
6. Yet, Vladimir Nabokov claims that even Oscar Wilde, an exemplary aesthe ist, was among those who "were in reality rank moralists and didacticists" (St Opinions 33).
7. Some, especially recent, poststructuralist literary theory and criticism d engage ethical issues, even though such work does not ask the same questions arrive at the same conclusions that Gardner does. See, for example, Miller's The E of Reading. Cf. Harpham, 8. See, for example, Nabokov's assertion that he "has no social purpose, no mo message;... I just like composing riddles with elegant solutions" (Strong Opini 16). This is a view he reiterates in many of his infamous forewords, and in t Afterword to Lolita, in which he contrasts his own views with those of "John R Jr.," the "editor" he created for Lolita. Ray praises the book's "ethical impact" "general lesson" (7); in the Afterword, Nabokov argues that, "despite John R assertion, Lolita has no moral in tow" (316). Palmer suggests that Gardner's boo a "defense of the tradition for which John Ray is an ironic spokesman" (162); Gar himself criticizes Nabokov for being concerned with "aesthetic bliss" over all Yet, Nabokov's views of the relation between ethics and aesthetics are more comp than they might appear. For instance, in his Lectures on Literature, Nabokov cla that "a major writer combines these three--storyteller, teacher, enchanter" (5), a elsewhere he accurately prophesied that future critics would find him "a r moralist kicking sin, cuffing stupidity ... and assigning sovereign power to tend ness, talent, and pride" (Strong Opinions 193).
9. Of course, one could easily turn Gardner's ethical standards back upon t book itself. Written by someone who advocates love, kindness, and respect others, this is often a remarkably ill-tempered, judgmental, and dogmatic book (e though at times it is also impassioned, eloquent, and wise). In one rather o wrought passage, Gardner criticizes "our schools thrown up like barricades in way of young minds, our brainless fat religions, our ritual of fornicating wit pretty or even horse-faced strangers" [unless "we" are women]; he claims that "praise debauchery as pluralism" (100).
10. And many of us would want to expand one of these concerns to "the goodn of men and women" or "the goodness of human beings." This common problem-us the male as generic but also as normative and universal-suggests some of reasons why contemporary theorists, especially feminists, have been skeptica 
